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Using data from surveys of enterprises in Sri Lanka after 
the December 2004 tsunami, the authors undertake the 
first microeconomic study of the recovery of the private 
firms in a developing country following a major natural 
disaster. Disaster recovery in low-income countries is 
characterized by the prevalence of relief aid rather than 
of insurance payments; the data show this distinction 
has important consequences. The data indicate that aid 
provided directly to households correlates reasonably 
well with reported losses of household assets, but is 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a 
larger effort in the group to study microenterprise dynamics. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web 
at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at dmckenzie@worldbank.org.  
uncorrelated with reported losses of business assets. 
Business recovery is found to be slower than commonly 
assumed, with disaster-affected enterprises lagging behind 
unaffected comparable firms more than three years 
after the disaster. Using data from random cash grants 
provided by the project, the paper shows that direct aid is 
more important in the recovery of enterprises operating 
in the retail sector than for those operating in the 
manufacturing and service sectors.  
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“What seems more typical are the comments appearing six months to a year after a 
disaster, expressing surprise at the speed with which the community has recovered, and 
the prosperity that now reigns.” 
    (Dacy and Kunreuther, 1969) 
 
 
A series of catastrophic events in recent years has drawn increased attention of 
both the public and researchers to the plight of those impacted by natural disasters. The 
number of natural disasters reported by the press and included in the most comprehensive 
disaster database is increasing. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) 
believes that the frequency of natural disasters is “likely” to increase as a consequence of 
global warming. Some argue that the current increase results from more complete 
reporting of disasters, and others say that the future trend driven by climate change is 
uncertain. But there is little disagreement that the impact of natural disasters is felt most 
severely by households already living on the margins in low-income countries.
1 The 
death toll from disasters, for example, is typically much higher in low-income countries 
(Kahn 2005).   
There is a large literature on how households in developing countries cope with 
and respond to disasters and aggregate shocks. (See Skoufias (2003) for an overview.) 
The poor suffer disproportionately because missing credit and formal insurance markets 
limit their ability to smooth aggregate shocks. The informal risk-coping strategies that are 
used to smooth idiosyncratic shocks break down when all members of a risk-sharing 
group are affected (Morduch, 1999). As a result, transient shocks can have permanent 
effects, either through a lowered ability of households to provide nutrition or schooling 
for their children (Maccini and Yang, 2009; Ferreira and Schady, 2009), or through the 
inability to repurchase productive assets, such as livestock, which are sold to smooth 
consumption (Carter et al, 2007).  
                                                 
1 The trend of an increasing number of disasters shown in the EM-DAT data is likely due in part or in 
whole to a more complete reporting of disasters. (See, for example, the discussion in Strömberg 2007.)    3
These same market failures that can limit the ability of households to recover 
quickly from disasters are also likely to inhibit the recovery of microenterprises and small 
businesses. Yet the existing literature has not looked at the process of enterprise recovery 
in developing countries, and even in developed countries there are only a handful of 
qualitative case studies. Until recent disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the Asian 
tsunami, the conventional wisdom, reflected in the quote from Dacy and Kunreuther’s 
book, is that the economy recovers surprising quickly.
2 Based in qualitative interviews 
with small business owners shortly after Hurricane Katrina, Runyan (2006) concludes 
that insurance is key: firms with insurance quickly replace destroyed assets, but that those 
without insurance could not, often because business records lost in the flooding and 
destruction were required to access federal aid. Large government and non-profit aid 
flows are also common in developing countries after natural disasters. The literature has 
examined the determinants of how international financial flows such as aid respond to 
disasters (e.g. Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007; Yang, 2009), but there is little about how 
and whether this aid reaches enterprise owners. 
This paper provides the first microeconomic study of the recovery of the private 
sector in a developing country following a major natural disaster. We use firm-level panel 
data gathered from micro enterprises in southern Sri Lanka following the December 2004 
Asian tsunami. In addition to surveys, the post-tsunami project involved a field 
experiment providing grants to randomly selected enterprises. The grants allow us to 
assess the importance of capital in the recovery process and measure the return to capital 
immediately following a disaster. 
                                                 
2  Most of the research by economists examining the aftermath of disasters focuses on short-term recovery 
process, rather than the longer-term rebuilding process (Okuyama 2003). Analysis of longer term recovery 
generally uses aggregate data such as building permits (Dacy and Kunreuther 1969). Two exceptions using 
micro-level data are Smith and McCarty (1996), who analyze the demographic changes in southern Dade 
Country, Florida following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, and Dolfman et al (2007) who estimate losses in 
employment and wages in New Orleans following Katrina.   4
Recovery in low-income countries differs from recovery in high-income countries 
most notably in the flow of cash to households and enterprises. A large share of 
households and businesses in high-income countries are covered by insurance against 
disasters. While about 50 percent of losses resulting from Hurricane Andrew in Florida 
and the Northridge earthquake in California were covered by insurance, for example, less 
than 15 percent of the losses resulting from the tsunami were covered (Ferguson 2006). 
Moreover, insurance coverage in low-income countries is typically limited to the largest 
enterprises. Few households or small businesses have insurance to cover losses. Relief 
aid flows serve as a substitute for insurance flows, both in paying for the recovery and in 
stimulating economic activity. But as our data show, there are important differences 
between insurance and aid flows. Only a small part of disaster relief aid flows as cash 
directly to households and small businesses.
3 The larger share of aid comes in kind, with 
the majority channeled into infrastructure projects. Moreover, aid agencies are seldom in 
a position to verify actual losses of households or small-scale enterprises. So while 
insurance payments are closely related to the insured entity’s losses, aid payments to 
individuals, households, or firms may not reflect the actual losses suffered. Where do 
households and enterprises obtain funds to rebuild? How long does the process of 
rebuilding take? Our data are uniquely suited to shed light on these questions.  
The December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami produced catastrophic damage along 
Sri Lanka’s eastern and southern coastlines. Official estimates put total deaths in Sri 
Lanka at more than 35,000. More than half a million people were displaced when their 
houses were damaged or destroyed. Estimated damage to infrastructure and other assets 
                                                 
3 See Oxfam (2005) for an argument that cash aid flowing directly to households should be more common 
following disasters. Harvey (2005) reviews the state of knowledge on cash aid following disasters. These 
discussions focus largely on household recovery rather than microenterprise recovery. There is also a 
debate among microfinance practitioners about the role of loan forgiveness in disaster recovery. See 
Mathison (2003) for a discussion of these issues.    5
exceeded $1.3 billion, around 7 percent of the country’s GDP.
4 The tsunami’s impact was 
concentrated in a narrow strip along the coast, and in the fishing and tourism sectors. 
Aggregate Sri Lankan GDP fell only by between 0.5 and 1.0 percent (Jayasuriya et al, 
2005). But two-thirds of the island’s fishing fleet was destroyed (Asian Development 
Bank et al, 2005), and—in spite of the fact that the arrival of aid workers dampened the 
blow—hotel bookings fell by 60 percent on Sri Lanka’s southern coast in 2005.   
The international response to the disaster was rapid and strong. Governments, 
international NGOs and the international financial institutions committed over $2 billion 
in relief and recovery funds, of which $1.1 billion had been dispersed and $0.6 billion 
expended 18 months after the disaster (Government of Sri Lanka, 2006). Of the total aid 
pledged, $184 million was categorized as “relief” aid. The remainder was for recovery of 
the housing ($370 million), transportation ($245 million committed), and water ($190 
million) infrastructure and for livelihood restoration ($219 million).   
Though the prevalence of insurance and aid differs in high- and low-income 
countries, businesses face a similar set of shocks following a natural disaster regardless of 
their location. We discuss three factors that typically affect the recovery process and give 
us reason to believe the findings here would apply more broadly to recovery from other 
large disasters. First, labor and capital are destroyed. In Sri Lanka, it appears the impact 
on the capital stock was proportionately larger than the impact on the labor force, almost 
certainly the usual pattern. Second, demand shifts. In aggregate, the shift will generally 
be inward. But for some sectors (e.g., construction materials), demand may shift outward. 
Third, many trading relationships are destroyed, either temporarily or permanently. The 
time required to re-form relationships depends on the nature of the relationships in a 
given sector. This effect is analogous to the “disorganization” effects discussed in the 
                                                 
4 This is the figure reported in the EM-DAT database. An assessment by the Asian Development Bank, 
World Bank and Japanese Bank for International Cooperation estimated losses of roughly $1.0 billion and 
replacement costs of $1.5 billion. The Sri Lankan government estimated recovery costs to be $1.8 billion.    6
literature on transition economies (Blanchard and Kremer 1997; Roland and Verdier, 
1999). We use our panel data to examine enterprise recovery from each of these shocks.  
We begin in Section 2 by discussing the data and examining the sources of funds 
available to enterprises and households to pay for repair or replacement of lost assets. In 
Section 3, we use random capital shocks we generated as a part of the project to assess 
the value of access to liquid capital in the recovery process. We study the timeline of 
recovery in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5 section with a discussion of policies that 
might quicken the recovery of microenterprises following a major disaster.  
 
Section 2: Firm Losses and Sources of Recovery Funds 
Even in normal circumstances, credit and insurance market failures loom large for 
business owners in developing countries (e.g. Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). A variety of 
informal mechanisms have evolved to overcome these market failures, but aggregate 
shocks such as economic crises and natural disasters can limit the effectiveness of 
informal financing and risk-coping mechanisms. In particular, group-based informal 
insurance arrangements are ineffective, as the incomes of a household’s risk-pooling 
partners also fall (Lustig, 2000). Already limited access to formal credit may become 
even more limited. As a result, it is of interest to ask: What resources do owners of 
microenterprises and small firms use to replace buildings and equipment that are 
destroyed or damaged in major disasters? And, how quickly are the enterprise owners 
able to replace assets lost in the disaster? 
 
The survey data 
We provide some answers to these questions using three surveys we conducted 
with enterprise owners and wage workers along the southern coast of Sri Lanka after the 
tsunami. Each of the three samples contains information on 400 to 600 individuals: 130 
to 200 individuals suffering asset losses from the tsunami, an equal number of individuals   7
living or working in the nearby neighborhoods but not suffering any asset damage, and an 
third set of individuals living and working outside the tsunami-affected area. We refer to 
the first group of individuals as “directly affected,” the second as “indirectly affected,” 
and the third as “unaffected.” We believe these data are unique in allowing us to examine 
the recovery process of small scale enterprise in a low-income country.  
The first survey is a panel of 618 household enterprises, interviewed quarterly 
between April 2005 and April 2007, and again in October 2007 and April 2008. The 
April 2005 baseline survey asked owners which assets were damaged or destroyed by the 
tsunami, and all waves of the survey ask about the repair or replacement of those assets. 
The July 2005 survey has questions on grants and loans obtained to replace assets. 
Enterprises in the panel were also subject to random capital injections in May and 
November 2005, as described in more detail in Section 3 below. Note that all of the data 
on asset damage and aid received are self reported. The small scale enterprises and 
households which comprise the majority of the samples seldom keep written records of 
assets or business transactions. Thus, while the surveys provide very detailed micro-level 
data, we have no way to verify any of the responses. We discuss this issue in more detail 
later in the paper.  
In July 2007 we conducted two additional surveys—one with a sample of 456 
wage workers and the other with a sample of 424 enterprises with between five and 50 
employees. The wage workers all live in the same neighborhoods as the microenterprise 
owners.
5 Because we did not find enough larger enterprises in these neighborhoods, the 
enterprise sample was drawn from surrounding areas as well. These surveys asked 
households and enterprise owners about damage suffered from the tsunami, the extent to 
which the damaged assets had been replaced or repaired, and the sources of funds used to 
                                                 
5 Sri Lanka is divided into 25 districts, which are divided further into 324 Divisions. These are further 
divided into just over 14,000 Grama Nalidaris, or GNs, which are the smallest administrative units. There 
are about 400 households in a typical GN. The microenterprise sample was drawn from 25 GNs in the 
districts of Kalutara, Galle and Matara.   8
pay for those repairs. We asked households and business owners if they received 
payments from insurance claims or aid in the form of grants, or loans.  
 
Asset recovery 
Summary data on the extent of damage, insurance coverage, and aid are shown on 
Table 1. The reported damages reflect differences in wealth and income among the three 
samples. The larger firm (SME) owners report losing an average of just over $40,000 in 
business assets and $6,000 in household assets. Wage workers report household losses 
averaging $5,000, while the microenterprise owners report losses of $897 in business 
assets and just over $2,400 in household assets. The table demonstrates the lack of 
insurance coverage in all three samples. Even among the larger enterprise owners, only 
13% of those suffering losses reported having any insurance coverage for business assets, 
and their policies generally did not cover damage from tsunamis. Those with insurance 
report that only 7.5 percent of business losses were covered. Similar patterns hold for 
household assets. Among the larger enterprise owners, only 4.1 percent said they had any 
insurance on household assets, and only 5.1 percent of household losses were covered. 
Among wage workers, only one of 153 directly affected by the tsunami report having 
insurance to cover losses.
6 
Owners and wage workers report receiving more funds from grants than from 
insurance; more than three-quarters of each group report receiving one or more grants. 
Loans are less common, especially among the microenterprise owners. Only in the case 
of wage workers, however, does the average respondent report that grants and loans 
combined covered as much as half of their losses. For SME owners, where the survey 
asked how the grants and loans were used, grants were more likely to cover housing 
                                                 
6 In contrast, 78% of households suffering damage from hurricane Andrew in Florida had insurance, and 
the insured received average payouts of $32,000 (Smith and McCarty, 1996). The percentage of insured 
was likely higher among businesses. Besides providing funds for the recovery of individuals’ assets, the 
$14 billion dollars of insurance aid following Hurricane Andrew provided a significant boost to the local 
economy that is lacking in the Sri Lankan case.   9
losses and loans more likely to cover business losses. For the typical SME owner, grants 
covered almost one-quarter of housing losses, but less than 2 percent of business losses. 
Loans covered an additional 13.7 percent of business losses for the SME owners.  
In Sri Lanka, cash aid came primarily through four programs. First, the Sri 
Lankan government paid surviving family members 15,000 Sri Lankan Rupees (LKR, 
about $150) for each person killed by the tsunami, to offset funeral expenses. Second, the 
government and the World Bank provided four grants of 5,000 LKR (about US $50) to 
220,000 households suffering direct damage from the tsunami.
7 Third, the government 
provided aid to rebuild houses destroyed by the tsunami. Finally, the government and 
numerous NGOs sponsored cash-for-work programs, which typically paid workers 
around 300-350 LKR ($3.00-$3.50) per day to participate in cleanup and rebuilding 
activities. So while much of the aid came in-kind, there was a significant amount of cash 
aid provided.  
Our April 2005 microenterprise survey indicates that the households of owners 
received an average of $115 in aid during the first three months of the tsunami, of which 
$101 came from government programs, $8 from NGOs and $6 from other sources. Table 
1 shows that by July 2005, 94 percent of those reporting damage had receive some form 
of aid. However, the mean aid received ($332 among those receiving something) was less 
than 10 percent of the reported damage.
8 The grants reported by microenterprise owners 
cover only a small portion of the losses they incurred. Loans were much less common. 
Less then 4 percent of microenterprise owners reported receiving loans, and these 
covered less than 1 percent of losses in aggregate. The data on Table 1 are self reported, 
and we should be concerned that the reported losses are exaggerated and the reported aid 
                                                 
7 According to Jayasuriya et al (2005), the number of beneficiaries was reduced from over 800,000 to 
around 200,000 after the first two payments. The smaller number represents only around 50,000 
households.  
8 The enterprises appear to have reported grants provided by our project itself, as described below, so these 
amounts likely overstate the aid received by typical microenterprises. Those receiving our grants reported 
cash aid averaging just over $100 more than those not receiving our grants.   10
understated. However, one measure suggests that the data are not far from reality. The   
program to replace or repair housing made payments totaling $2,500 per household, 
almost exactly the same average amount as the grants reported by wage workers.  SME 
owners reported grants averaging around $1,600.  
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the reported aid is the lack of correlation 
between reported losses and reported grants and loans. For SME owners, where we are 
able to separate business from household aid, the correlation between the reported loss of 
household assets and the grants (loans) received is 0.70 (0.27). For business assets, on the 
other hand, there is essentially no correlation between the reported losses and the (very 
small level of) grants received; the correlation between losses of business assets and 
loans to replace those assets is 0.16. For wage workers, the correlation between grants 
and household losses is 0.31. Finally, for microenterprise owners, there is no correlation 
between the level of losses on the one hand and grants or loans on the other. So while 
overall aid flows into Sri Lanka following the tsunami were large, and while at least some 
aid there flowed directly to households suffering losses, the data suggest that targeting is 
particularly poor with regard to damage suffered by business owners. 
 
Enterprise recovery 
Given the lack of insurance and low aid flows, we find it surprising that owners 
report the majority of damaged assets had been replaced or repaired by the summer of 
2007. Households report having replaced 60% of lost assets, while SME and 
microenterprise owners report having replaced more than two-thirds of their assets. By 
April 2008, 75 percent of microenterprise owners reported having replaced all of the 
housing assets damaged by the tsunami. Where did they obtain funds to repair or replace 
damaged assets? The survey data allow us to provide some insight on this question, and 
to say something about the speed of recovery, with regard to the microenterprises.    11
Among the 204 firms suffering tsunami damage, 168 (82 percent) repaired or 
replaced some damaged enterprise assets within three months of the tsunami. On average, 
owners suffering damage reported spending US$111 on enterprise recovery in the three 
months following the tsunami. Excluding those spending nothing in this period, the 
average expenditure was $135. While a substantial sum relative to pre-tsunami income 
levels, the amount represents less than 15 percent of the assets lost or damaged by the 
tsunami. The largest initial effort went to equipment and working capital: an average of 
US$39 was spent on equipment, representing 25 percent of the losses in this category. 
Relative to the losses suffered, the smallest investment was in land and buildings, where 
owners reported spending US$29 compared with losses of US$362.
9  
What were the sources of funds which enterprises used to replace lost or damaged 
equipment? On average, just over half of the funds spent in the first three months came 
from own savings (51 percent). An additional 15 percent were obtained through loans 
from family members (9 percent) or friends (6 percent). One-fifth of the resources (20 
percent) came from grants or loans from tsunami relief agencies. The remaining 14 
percent was spread among credit from suppliers (6 percent), loans from microfinance 
organizations (2 percent), moneylenders (2 percent), banks (less than 1 percent), 
remittances from relatives abroad (1 percent) and other sources. The largest spenders 
relied more heavily on loans from family members and credit from suppliers, while those 
spending the least relied more on own savings. As a percentage of the total amount spent 
by all 176 entrepreneurs with complete data, own savings represents only 36 percent of 
expenditures. Loans from family members (13 percent) and friends (20 percent) are 
together almost as important, and credit from suppliers, at 11 percent of the total funds 
spent, is also more important than the unweighted averages suggest.  
                                                 
9 The data on assets lost in this paragraph differ slightly from those reported for microenterprises in Table 
1, because the data here come from the baseline survey while those in Table one come from the October 
2007 retrospective survey. The two means are actually quite close, however, with owners reporting 
business losses of $814 in the April 2005 survey and $897 in the October 2007 survey.   12
Given the breadth of damage in local areas, we might expect those with family 
and social networks extending outside the direct impact zone to have recovered more 
quickly, since their networks extend to unaffected areas. The evidence available to us on 
this, while mixed, is not particularly strong. In the April 2008 survey, we asked 
entrepreneurs whether their relatives were affected by the tsunami. Questions covered 
parents, siblings, parents- and siblings-in-law, and adult children who were living at the 
time of the tsunami. We do not find that those with parents or children who were 
unaffected by the tsunami spent a larger amount on recovering assets in the months 
following the tsunami, or that they obtained a larger share of the funds they did spend 
from family members. We do find that entrepreneurs who lived in a different 
administrative district (DS Division) at age 12 report using family members as a source 
for a slightly higher portion of their recovery funds (14 percent vs. 9 percent), but the 
difference is not significant. Those who lived outside the same DS Division at age 12 also 
report having spent more to replace and repair assets during the first three months, both at 
the mean ($185 vs. $102, p=0.12) and the median ($40 vs. $33). These data suggest a 
surprisingly large contribution to the recovery comes from the owners’ savings and loans 
from family and friends. 
Figures 1 and 2 show that enterprises suffering damage had recovered to their pre-
tsunami size within about 15 months of the tsunami. The figures show the value of 
equipment, tools and vehicles used in the enterprise (Figure 1) and profits (Figure 2) 
across time, as a percentage of the reported values in the month before the tsunami 
(November 2004). Mean profits of directly affected firms fell to 65 percent of the pre-
tsunami level in March 2005 before recovering to 107 percent of the pre-tsunami level by 
March 2006. Capital stock shows a similar pattern. Both figures compare the directly 
affected enterprises with the unaffected enterprises.
10 Note that while the affected 
                                                 
10 We use the set of firms not receiving one of the random grants provided by the project (as discussed 
below) and reporting profits in all 11 rounds of our panel survey. We trim firms with profits in the top and   13
enterprises recovered to pre-tsunami levels, the profits and capital stocks of the 
unaffected firms grew by 30 percent to 50 percent over this same period. Indeed, the 
affected firms remain smaller in both profits and investment more than three years after 
the tsunami.  
In sum, the data paint a fairly consistent picture of the process of recovery of 
business assets. The magnitude of the total aid flow to the affected area was roughly 
comparable to what might be expected following a disaster in the United States. But the 
flow was of a very different character, with less insurance and more aid. The portion of 
the aid and insurance flowing directly to households and small scale enterprises appears 
to be modest compared to the size of the losses incurred. Moreover, while we find some 
correlation between the magnitude of the aid flows and the magnitude of the losses with 
respect to losses of household assets, we find no correlation between losses of business 
assets and aid flows. Consistent with this, the recovery of household assets is complete 
within three years for a majority of households, while the affected enterprises lag behind 
a comparable group of unaffected enterprises more than three years after the event.  
 
Section 3: Profitability and the Incentive to Recover Assets 
Given the low levels of official aid firms report receiving, we find even the partial 
recovery of assets surprising. The households of microenterprise owners have low levels 
of wealth, and few liquid assets. The recovery of the majority of their assets at a time 
when competing demands for available funds must have been great suggests the 
microenterprise owners had strong incentives to replace their assets. Did extraordinary 
opportunities for profit drive enterprise recovery in the tsunami impact zone? We provide 
                                                                                                                                                 
bottom 1 percent, and then plot an index of mean real profits over the period November 2004 to September 
2007. Nominal profits were converted to real profits using the monthly Sri Lanka Consumer’s Price Index, 
available at http://www.statistics.gov.lk/price/slcpi/slcpi_monthly.htm. Annual inflation was 4.0 percent 
between March 2005 and March 2006, and 18.6 percent between March 2006 and March 2007. Inflation 
was an additional 10.3 percent in the six months from March 2007 to September 2007.   14
evidence on this question by providing randomly allocated grants to a portion of 
microenterprises in a panel survey, as described in more detail below. 
A simple framework results in two predictions, which we test with the data. 
Assume firms have Cobb-Douglas production functions and operate in perfectly 
competitive output markets. The output of firm i is 
) 1 (     i i i L AK Y , with K, and L 
representing capital and labor, and Y representing the output of goods with unit price. 
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We allow the opportunity cost of both capital and labor to be firm specific, reflecting less 
than perfect input markets. Since the enterprises in our sample employ few workers 
outside the family,  ) (w wi  reflects the individual’s opportunity cost of time, which 
depends on the market wage rate, w.  
The tsunami appears to have destroyed a larger share of the capital stock than the 
labor force. The estimated value of the lost assets was US$1 billion, just over 1 percent of 
the country’s pre-tsunami capital stock. About 35,000 people were killed, less than 0.2 
percent of the population.
11 A decrease in capital relative to labor leads to an increase in 
the returns to capital at the margin, and a decrease in the return to labor at the margin. 
But at least three factors might offset this. First, the psychological trauma 
following the devastation may have increased at least temporarily the opportunity cost of 
the owner’s time. Owners reported (to us and to others) that they did not feel like 
working in the weeks and months following the event. Second, the tsunami caused shifts 
in the demand for output produced by the firms. Some evidence suggests that the 
                                                 
11 Because of the timing of the event and other factors, women were disproportionately likely to be killed. 
Since women have lower labor force participation rates, the effect on the labor force was likely less than 
0.2 percent.    15
immediate shift was inward. Fishing and tourism are the main industries along the 
southern Sri Lankan coast. Tourism fell precipitously, replaced partially a few weeks 
later by the inflow of relief workers. The demand for fish also fell. Much of the initial 
relief funding came in the form of in-kind aid. After the first few weeks, more of the aid 
appears to have come in cash or through the purchase and donation of goods produced 
locally such as fishing boats. Third, the tsunami caused other disruptions in production. 
Trading relationships were severely disrupted. The businesses of customers or suppliers 
of firms, particularly those located near the coast, were destroyed and in some cases, their 
owners were killed or severely injured. In some cases, the entire supply chain was 
disrupted. This is the case in the coir industry, for example, where the pits used to soak 
the coconut husks were filled with debris that took many months to clear. Even where 
alternative suppliers for an input did exist, market frictions might have led to production 
difficulties in some sectors. The simultaneous severing of many relationships is not 
unlike the “disorganization” following the breakup of the Soviet Union (see Blanchard 
and Kremer 1997; Roland and Verdier 1999).  
This discussion leads to two testable predictions. First, the disproportionate 
destruction of capital relative to labor should result in very high returns to capital among 
firms, at least where demand is restored by aid flows and relief workers. Second, the 
profitability is likely to be lower for manufacturers than for retailers, because 
manufacturers rely more on the availability of specific inputs, and generally have more 
intensive relationships with a smaller number of customers. For the same reasons, 
manufacturers are likely to recover more slowly.  
Other predictions of heterogeneity in the speed of recovery come from the broader 
development literature. We explore three: education, gender, and the extent to which 
immediate family members living in other households also were affected by the tsunami. 
Schultz (1975) argues that education and ability are particularly important in dealing with 
changes in economic conditions and economic disequilibria. We test to see if education   16
and other ability measures are associated with more rapid recovery. With respect to 
gender, the shock to the household may affect household bargaining and the allocation of 
resources. The recovery of males and females may differ as a result. Finally, gifts or 
loans from family members may be one source of capital for recovery. These are likely to 
be most commonly received from parents or adult children. Of course, aid from family 
members is less likely if family members were also affected by the tsunami.  
 
Using Experimental Data to Identify Returns to Recovery Funds 
The suddenness of disasters and logistical issues involved in coordinating the aid 
response make collecting data for households or enterprises receiving assistance a very 
difficult and rarely undertaken task. Even where such data are collected, identifying the 
role of capital in the recovery process is complicated by the presence of a number of 
unobserved factors which are likely to be correlated with both the speed of capital stock 
replacement and future profitability. Firms anticipating faster profit recovery may be 
more inclined to replace capital stock or find it easier to persuade family members to lend 
them resources. More politically connected firms may be better able to access aid flows. 
And the direction of causation may flow from profit recovery to capital stock, if firms 
replace damaged capital by reinvesting profits.  
To investigate whether high profits provided an incentive for replacing damaged 
assets, we carried out an experiment in which firms were randomly given grants of cash 
or in-kind grants to purchase material or equipment, selected by the owner for the 
enterprise. We describe in detail the results of the experiment among undamaged firms in 
de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008). The experiment gives us a clean measure of the 
role of capital in the disaster recovery process.  
Our baseline survey included 227 enterprises in directly affected areas along the 
coast. The enterprises were selected with a screening survey administered door-to-door in 
residential neighborhoods in the districts of Kalutara, Galle and Matara. Our intention   17
was to draw a sample of enterprises with less than 100,000 LKR (US$1000) in capital 
stock, excluding land and buildings. A screening survey eliminated enterprises hiring 
paid employees, those owning a motorized vehicle, and those engaged in professional 
services, fishing, and agriculture. After reviewing the baseline data, we eliminated 18 of 
the 227 enterprises either because they exceeded the 100,000 LKR maximum size ceiling 
we had set, or because a follow-up visit could not verify the existence of the enterprise. 
The remaining 209 firms constituted the baseline sample. These firms almost evenly split 
across two broad industry categories, with 107 in manufacturing or services and 102 in 
retail, and by gender of the owner, with 107 firms owned by females, 98 by males, and 7 
jointly owned.  
After the baseline survey, we randomly selected some of the enterprises and gave 
them either 10,000 LKR (about US$100) or 20,000 LKR (about US$200) either in cash 
or in-kind grants. In the latter case, the items to be purchased were selected by the owner, 
and purchased by research assistants working for the project. Cash treatments were given 
without restrictions; recipients were told they could purchase anything they wanted with 
the cash. The treatment was framed as compensation for participating in the panel survey, 
and enterprise owners were told that they would be eligible to win the grant only once.  
The aim of our experiment was to provide firms with an exogenous shock to 
capital stock, and to measure the impact of this on business profits. Within the affected 
zone 120 firms were assigned to treatment (57 percent), with 90 firms assigned to receive 
treatment after the baseline survey in May 2005 and a further 30 firms assigned to receive 
treatment after the third survey round in November 2005. This split frontloaded 
treatments so that more of the randomly allocated aid could reach tsunami victims sooner. 
The 120 treatments were made up of 77 of the 10,000 LKR treatments (39 cash, 38 in-
kind) and 43 of the 20,000 LKR treatments (21 cash, 22 in-kind).  
Our initial plan was to survey firms for five quarterly waves only. Receipt of 
further funding enabled us to continue the panel, with four additional quarterly waves   18
collected from July 2006 through April 2007, and a tenth and eleventh waves collected in 
October 2007 and April 2008. In order to compensate firms for the additional burden of 
staying in the study longer than we had anticipated, we gave 2,500 LKR (~$US25) in 
cash to each of the remaining untreated firms after round five of the survey.  
Attrition in the data is relatively low. Of the 209 baseline firms, 186 report profits 
in round five and 173 in round 11 (83 percent of the initial sample). However, only 197 
firms report profits in the baseline survey, and firms move in and out of the sample. One 
hundred thirty-five firms report profits in all 11 rounds, and 182 report profits in eight 
rounds or more. We restrict our analysis to the 200 firms reporting profits in three rounds 
or more.
12  Appendix 1 compares the characteristics of the treated and untreated firms 
among these 200. The randomization was done by computer, so any differences can only 
be due to chance or to the elimination of these nine firms that report less than three waves 
of profits. The two groups appear to be balanced on the key observable characteristics, 
but we will also include individual fixed effects to account for any baseline differences in 
levels remaining. 
 
The Impact of Grants on Profits 
We begin by estimating the mean impact of the grants on real profits of tsunami-
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Where AMOUNTi,t is an indicator of the amount of treatment received by firm i at time t, 
coded in terms of 100 LKR. Firms receiving 2,500 LKR after round 5 will thus have 
AMOUNT of 25 in rounds six through 11 (and 0 before this). The δs are wave dummies. 
                                                 
12 This eliminates six control firms and three firms assigned to receive the 10,000 LKR treatment.   19
Treatments are coded 0, 100, or 200 in the regressions so the coefficient shows 
the increase in profits in rupees from a 100 LKR treatment. Thus, the coefficients can be 
interpreted as the percentage return on the treatment. The interpretation of the 
coefficients from the regressions merits several comments. First, for all regressions we 
deflate profits by the all-island consumer price index. Second, since we use the amount of 
the treatment as the independent variable, we are measuring the intention to treat. As not 
all of the grants found their way into the enterprise, this may differ from the return to 
incremental investments. The intention to treat seems the more policy-relevant effect in 
the disaster recovery context. Third, we pool all waves of the survey, so the coefficient 
measures an average treatment effect for the three years following the first set of 
treatments. We find no significant time trend in the treatment effects, justifying the 
pooling of the data.
13  
The first column of Table 2 shows the effect of the treatment on real profits. A 
100 LKR grant increases average monthly profits by 9.90 LKR, representing a 9.9 
percent real monthly return on the treatment. The treatment effect is significant at the 5 
percent level. In column 2, we trim on extreme changes in profits. We eliminate 
observations lying above the 99
th percentile in either percentage or absolute changes in 
profits across waves of the sample. We trim the top but not the bottom of the distribution 
because rapid falls in profits are more likely to be due to owner illness, lack of demand, 
or other negative shocks that we do not want to trim from the data.
14 
In column 2, we trim observations where profits increased by more than 800 
percent or 15,000 LKR from one period to the next.  Ideally this trimming should not 
change the size of the estimated coefficient, but should increase its precision. In fact, we 
                                                 
13 Returns are slightly higher more than five quarters after treatment, but the difference is not significant at 
the 0.10 level.  
14 After receiving the data, we asked the survey firm to verify the records for all enterprises showing very 
large changes from one wave to the next. Several data points were corrected for keypunch errors. The 
survey firm also confirmed that several cases of large drops in profits were due to negative shocks suffered 
by the enterprise. Their opinion was that large increases were more likely due to incorrect recording of data 
in the field. On the basis of this exercise, we trim only the top tail of the data.   20
see a modest drop in the coefficient, to 8.9 percent, and a drop in the standard error. We 
trim the remaining regressions reported in the paper in a similar fashion. The treatment 
effect of 8.9 percent when we trim on changes compares to a treatment effect of 5.4 
percent for the indirectly affected and unaffected firms (de Mel, McKenzie and 
Woodruff, 2008). That is, grants have a far bigger impact on damaged firms, by a margin 
of half again as much as the effect on undamaged firms.
15 
In column 3 of Table 2 we examine whether the cash and in-kind grants have 
different effects. A 100 LKH cash grant increases profits by 5.3 LKR, and the in-kind 
grant by 12.2 LKR. But given the standard errors, we cannot reject equality of the two 
treatment effects (p=0.211). Therefore, evidence does not strongly support a preference 
for aid in kind over cash grants in terms of their ability to raise firm profits.  
Column 4 of Table 2 examines whether firm owners adjusted their labor hours in 
response to the treatment. A priori, the direction of any effect is unclear – repaired capital 
stock may allow owners to produce more, and hence increase complementary labor 
inputs, or may enable owners to substitute capital for labor, leading them to work less. 
The results in Table 2 show no strong effect in either direction. The point estimates 
suggest that owners reduce labor hours by 0.3 hours per week as a result of the treatment, 
and we cannot reject that the change in labor hours is zero. Thus, any effect on profits 
would appear to be attributable to the injection of capital rather than any associated 




                                                 
15 Note, however, that the standard errors are large enough that we cannot reject that the treatment effect for 
tsunami-affected enterprises is equal to that of unaffected enterprises, despite the large difference in point 
estimates. Table III, column 6 of De Mel et al. 2008 is the only part of that paper which involves the 
tsunami-affected firms: it reports a treatment effect of 9.08 percent for the tsunami-affected firms using 
only nine waves instead of the 11 waves of data here. The paper then refers to the current paper for 
analysis.   21
Demand, market friction, or production complementarity? 
  There are several dimensions along which we might expect to find heterogeneity 
in the post-disaster returns to capital. The tsunami resulted in the closure of many 
businesses on a temporary or (in the case of death) permanent basis. Where enterprises 
purchase from or sell to only a few trading partners, replacing these relationships might 
be expected to take time. Second, demand shocks may vary with the product of the 
enterprise. McKenzie (2006) shows that one way credit-constrained consumers respond 
to aggregate shocks is to cut back on their purchases of semi-durables to a much larger 
extent than would be predicted just from the income effect. As a consequence, we would 
expect demand to recover much more quickly in retail sales, and less quickly in 
manufacturing, as consumers shift their expenditure patterns to protect food consumption. 
Third, production assets may have stronger complementarity in manufacturing than in 
retail. Owners may need to replace all of their capital stock before they can produce. 
Retailers, on the other hand, may be able to sell goods even without assets such as display 
cases, refrigerators, and so forth. Finally, supply chains may have been disrupted. 
Manufacturers of products made from coconut husks (coir), for example, reported finding 
supplies difficult, as the lagoons used to process the husks took many weeks or months to 
clean. Without a supply of inputs, replacing machinery may be irrelevant.  
We investigate how the impact of the grants varies across sectors, and by the 
importance of individual customer and supplier relationship. We do this by estimating the 
following fixed effects regression in which the treatment variable and wave dummies are 
each interacted with sector or trading partner characteristics of the firm: 
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where Xi indicated the sector, the presence of a trading partner buying more than 25 
percent of output or supplying more than 25 percent of inputs, or some other 
characteristic of the enterprise or owner.   
The results by broad sector and trading partners are shown on Table 3. We show 
results with the sample trimmed at the 99
th percentile on percentage and absolute changes 
in profits, but the results are very similar without trimming. We find very significant 
differences in the impact of the grant on manufacturing firms compared to retail firms. 
Column 1 shows that the mean effect for retail firms is to increase real monthly profits by 
19.6 LKR for every 100 LKR received, equivalent to a 19.6 percent monthly return on 
the grant. In contrast, the interaction of amount with the manufacturing dummy is 
significant, large, and negative. Adding the interaction effect to the amount coefficient 
results in mean treatment effect which is slightly negative, and not significantly different 
from zero for manufacturing. The grant therefore had a large effect on retail, and no 
average effect on manufacturing. This is strikingly different from the results of applying 
the treatment to indirectly affected and unaffected firms, where there is no significant 
interaction with manufacturing.
16 It therefore appears that after the tsunami a lack of 
capital was not the main barrier to recovery of manufacturing, but that capital did 
significantly impact on the recovery of retail. 
Given the sample size, we are unable to say why capital is more important for 
retailers than for manufacturers. We suspect the explanation varies with the nature of the 
product. Both enterprise owners and NGOs told us, for example, that lack of inputs was 
the main constraint in the coir industry. The primary customers for producers of lace are 
tourists, so in that sector, a lack of demand may haven been the critical factor. Given our 
sample of about 100 manufacturers in the directly affected area, we are unable to 
                                                 
16 In particular, when we trim on changes in profits, the coefficient on retail*amount is 6.43 (s.e. 3.08) and 
the coefficient on manufacturing*amount is 4.08 (s.e. 2.80) when we estimate equation (4) for firms not 
damaged by the tsunami. The difference is insignificant (p=0.57).   23
differentiate between these explanations. We can say that we find no evidence that 
returns are lower among firms with suppliers or customers who account for a large share 
of trade. In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, we interact the treatment amount with a variable 
indicating the enterprise has a single customer accounting for at least 25 percent of sales 
(Column 2) or one supplier accounting for at least 25 percent of input purchases (Column 
3). Neither interaction is significant, suggesting that friction in trading relationships is not 
a cause of slow recovery. However, we take even this limited evidence with a grain of 
salt. The questions on which these variables are based were asked at the time of the 
baseline survey. As such, they reflect the situation after the tsunami rather than before.  
  
Other Dimensions of Heterogeneity 
Appendix 1 compares the characteristics of manufacturing and retail firms in our 
sample. The manufacturing firms are more likely to be run by females, have lower profits 
before the tsunami, and are more reliant on a single customer and a single supplier of 
inputs. They sell to far fewer customers per day, on average. The three largest sub-
industries within our manufacturing sample among directly affected firms are sewing 
clothes, spinning lace, and making food such as string hoppers (Sri Lankan rice noodles 
which are a dietary staple). These are all industries dominated by female owners. With 
the exception of food preparation, all other products made by the manufacturing firms are 
semi-durables, for which demand is likely to recover more slowly. Furthermore, a greater 
reliance on a major customer and/or a major supplier increases the likelihood that a 
disruption in this relationship as a result of the tsunami will have a large effect on the 
firm. 
In de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008, 2009) we find that returns are 
significantly lower in enterprises owned by females than in enterprises owned by males. 
Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility that the overall mean effect of the treatment is 
zero for female owners. In the tsunami-affected zone, however, we find no significant   24
difference between returns in male- and female-owned enterprises. Column 4 Table 3 
suggests the mean female effect is about 70 percent of the male effect. We posit that the 
difference reflects the value of capital in recovery compared with the value of capital in 
expansion. In the directly affected area, the grants helped owners return their business to 
their pre-tsunami size. In the unaffected areas, the grants allowed owners to expand their 
businesses. The higher returns for females in the directly affected area suggests that 
recovering the enterprise is as valuable for females for males, while the low returns for 
females in unaffected areas suggests that expanding the businesses from the steady state 
size may not be profitable.  
  An additional hypothesis is that recovery may be faster for more educated, able 
business owners. Schultz (1975) has argued that an important role of education is 
providing the ability to deal with changes in economic conditions and economic 
disequilibria. Column 5 of Table 3 shows that the treatment has a positive, but 
insignificant interaction with the years of education of the firm owner. The point estimate 
is positive and similar in size to the significant coefficient found among indirectly 
affected and unaffected firms (de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008). The results are 
therefore consistent with the view that among small firms, more able firm owners are 
further away from their optimal capital stock level (even prior to the disaster), and hence 
have higher returns to capital. They do not suggest that human capital can serve as a 
substitute for physical capital in the recovery process – which would require a negative 
interaction between the grant and human capital. 
  Finally, we asked owners if they had parents or adult children who were not 
affected by the tsunami. Unaffected family members might serve as an alternative source 
of aid in the absence of insurance or grants tied directly to losses. Though we did not find 
that those with unaffected family members received larger loans from family members, 
we did find that those with parents or adult children who were unaffected by the tsunami 
had lower returns from the treatments. Indeed, the results suggest that those with both   25
adult children and parents who were untouched by the tsunami had zero returns to the 
treatment. Though we did not stratify the treatment on this variable, the results are 
consistent with social networks being an important source of recovery funds. Those 
without family networks in the position to provide help after the disaster have particularly 
high-valued uses for recovery funds.  
 
Profitability and investment 
  If profitability is higher in retail, we should expect to find that retailers invest a 
larger share of the grants than manufactures. Table 4 presents evidence weakly consistent 
with this expectation. We regress capital stock reported in each wave of the survey 
against the treatment amount and the treatment amount interacted with a variable 
indication the firm is a manufacturer. The regressions also include firm and wave fixed 
effects, and wave / manufacturing interaction effects. The regression is trimmed on the 
absolute and percentage change in reported profits. Retailers appear to invest all of the 
grant in the enterprise. A 10,000 LKR grant is associated with an increase in the average 
retailer’s capital stock of 10,600 LKR. Manufacturers appear to invest a lower portion of 
the grant in their business, about 6,400 LKR of a 10,000 LKR grant. Thus, the 
investments behavior of manufacturers appears consistent with lower returns in the 
manufacturing sector.  
 
Section 4: The Speed of Recovery 
  The high returns to capital in the recovery zone provide a strong incentive for 
reinvesting capital. If investment is in fact responding to that profit incentive, then we 
should find that retailers recover their capital stock, sales and profits more rapidly than 
manufacturers, even absent grants provided by the experiment. In this section, we 
examine this correspondence. In particular, we are interested in the question: Do   26
untreated manufacturers recover more slowly than untreated retailers? That is, is the 
behavior of the treated firms consistent with the data from the untreated sample?  
Before looking at the microenterprise panel data, we note that the SME sample 
includes both retailers and manufacturers. There are relatively few retailers among the 
larger enterprises. The sample includes only 28 retailers (including hotels and restaurants) 
that were damaged by the tsunami. But these retailers had replaced 78 percent of their 
assets on average (85 percent at the median), compared with 64 percent (60 percent at the 
median) among the manufacturers. The difference in means is significant at the .05 level, 
in spite of the small sample size. On the other hand, we find no significant difference 
between retailers and manufacturers with respect to replacing household assets. By the 
summer of 2007, larger retailers had replaced 71 percent of the household assets damaged 
in the tsunami, compared with 67 percent for manufacturers. These data suggest that 
manufacturers had as many resources available to them as retailers for use in replacing 
household assets. These data are thus consistent with retailers having stronger incentives 
to replace or repair business assets.  
We do not have good measures of inventories prior to the tsunami. This is a 
concern, because a larger share of retailers’ investment is made in inventories. 
Admittedly, even our measures of profits and sales are retrospective. However, leaving 
aside concerns about deliberate misreporting, we believe these are likely to more 
accurately reflect the pre-tsunami situation. Using the untreated part of the 
microenterprise sample, we now examine the characteristics of firms that recovered more 
quickly. We estimate the following random effects model for log real profits for untreated 
firm i in time period t=2,…,11: 
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where Xi is a vector of baseline characteristics of the owner and the firm,  PROFITSi,March 
2005 and PROFITSi,November 2004 are the firm’s profits in March 2005 and November 2004 
respectively, the δt are wave effects, and μi is a firm random effect. We estimate this for 
the unbalanced sample of untreated firms experiencing business damage. This gives 702 
observations on 80 firms. Since real profits are expressed in logs, the vector of 
coefficients β multiplied by 100 can be interpreted as the percentage growth in profits 
associated with a one unit change in Xi. It is likely that the association with Xi will vary 
from quarter to quarter, in which case β is giving the average effect of Xi over the three 
years post-tsunami studied. 
  The choice of variables to include in Xi  in equation (3) is guided by several 
competing hypotheses about the factors that might be most strongly linked to the speed of 
enterprise recovery. Schooling and gender were discussed above. We also include 
variables indicating the age of the owner and enterprise and the marital status of the 
owner. We have shown that access to capital may be important, at least for retailers. 
Since the tsunami destroyed physical capital of the business, access to credit is likely to 
be one determinant of how quickly firms can replace this capital and recover. Our 
baseline survey asks whether firms have ever had a loan from a private bank, government 
bank, microfinance program, or government program.  This category includes 30 percent 
of untreated firms with business damage. However, 26 percent of firms still had 
outstanding loans dating from before the tsunami, for which payments generally 
continued to be paid. Previous use of credit may therefore not be a very good indicator of 
the ability to raise new capital after the tsunami.  
Another characteristic that might affect a firm’s recovery is its formality status. A 
firm’s registration (in our case with the Pradeshiya Saba (municipal organization) or 
District Secretariat) arguably offers a potential advantage by establishing a record of the 
firm’s existence prior to the disaster, and providing some basic information on its sales   28
and assets. Also, formalization enables firms better access to credit, according to often 
heard claims. However, in our discussions with NGOs and government officials working 
on tsunami recovery programs, registration of the firm apparently was not used to 
identify firms as potential aid recipients, as a precondition for loans, or for verification of 
pre-tsunami asset levels. We therefore expect to see no significant effect of formalization 
on recovery, but include this variable as a check of the formality hypothesis. 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (3). Column 1 shows our base 
specification. Baseline and pre-tsunami profits are positively and significantly associated 
with profits in latter waves of the panel. Conditional on these, we see that profit recovery 
in the absence of the capital provided by our grants is slower for manufacturing firms, 
female-owned firms, and firms located closer to the coast. The speed of recovery is not 
significantly associated with the owner’s education, age, or marital status, or the age of 
the enterprise. We also find no evidence that formally registered firms recover more 
quickly. There is a sizeable positive point estimate on having previously had a loan, 
consistent with greater access to capital aiding recovery. However, the standard errors are 
large, so we cannot reject zero effect. 
Columns 2 and 3 control for whether the firm has a major supplier or major 
customer accounting for 25 percent or more of inputs or sales respectively. We see a 
strong negative and significant effect of having a major customer. Firms with a major 
customer average 33 percent less profit growth over this period. Overall, the recovery of 
profits among the untreated sample suggests a consistent with the experimental results. 
Manufacturers appear to recover more slowly than retailers.  
 
Section 5: Conclusions 
  In large, well-publicized disasters affecting low-income countries, the flow of 
relief and recovery aid is often very large. This paper uses data from surveys of private 
enterprises and households in Sri Lanka in an attempt to understand how that aid might   29
be more effectively administered. We find that the aid flow to households for the purpose 
of recovering household assets damaged by the tsunami was large and positively 
correlated with the damage suffered by the household. In contrast, the aid flow to 
enterprises was small and not well correlated with reported damage. 
  In spite of the lack of aid flowing to businesses, enterprises reported having 
replaced or repaired two-thirds of the damaged assets 30 months after the tsunami, our 
findings show. Surprisingly, among the smallest enterprises, the majority of the funds 
used to pay for recovery came from personal savings or from loans or gifts from family 
members and friends. Recovery aid and formal loans were a less important source of 
finance for recovery. We find this surprising because these households are generally 
thought to be the most capital constrained. Nonetheless, despite this partial recovery of 
capital stock, tsunami-affected firms still had lower profits and capital stock three years 
after the tsunami than similar firms not damaged by the tsunami, suggesting the recovery 
process is slower than often assumed. 
  Using the random allocation of cash grants to enterprises, we find that returns to 
capital among retailers in the recovery zone are very large—much larger than in inland 
areas less affected by the tsunami. But among manufacturers, the incremental capital 
provided by the grants did not result in higher profits. The high returns, of course, 
provided an incentive to invest in the enterprises during the recovery period. The data 
also show that the recovery was more rapid among those operating in the retail sector 
than among those in manufacturing or services. 
  We believe that many of the findings from the tsunami experience would apply 
more broadly to the recovery of firms from other disasters, especially those arising from 
infrequent natural phenomena such as tsunamis and earthquakes. Arguably, firms may 
take more ex ante actions when exposed to more frequent natural disasters such as 
hurricanes. But even where disasters are recurrent, the majority of microenterprises are 
likely to be uninsured. The general pattern of large aid flows and poor targeting toward   30
business recovery seems generalizable, as does the change in demand and supply chain 
disruption leading to faster recovery for retail than manufacturing. 
  We interpret the data as supporting the use of cash grants in disaster recovery, but 
only in limited cases. Grants to firms in retail trade stimulate more rapid recovery of 
these enterprises. The data also support a greater use of cash aid in household recovery. 
The spending by households in local shops provides a stimulus that is lacking with in-
kind aid. Finally, we believe the experiment has demonstrated the ability of random 
grants to generate knowledge about how to increase the speed with which small 
enterprises recover. If global warming leads to more frequent and more severe water-
related disasters, as climate change experts predict, this knowledge will be increasingly 
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(Advances), Article 13.Business Household Household Business Household
Number suffering damage 139 97 153 197 176
Mean damage (USD at 100Rs/$) $40,200 $6,282 $5,079 $897 (2) $2,421
% of those with loss covered by insurance 12.9% 4.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0%
7.5% 5.1% 33.3% NA NA
1.7% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%
% receiving grant for repair 23.7% 75.3% 86.4% 94.4%
% receiving loan for repair 25.9% 9.3% 20.5% 3.5%
Mean aid received from government / NGOs (3) $2,101 $2,068 $1,361 $332
Mean loan received from government or banks (3) $21,215 $3,122 $1,738 $496
Mean % losses covered by grants 1.2% 24.8% 48.9% 20.8%
Mean % of losses covered by loans 13.7% 4.6% 25.3% 0.4%
Correlation of losses and aid received 0.02 0.70 0.31 -0.02
Correlation of losses and loans received 0.16 0.27 -0.07 0.09
% of all losses covered by insurance, grants or loans 16.9% 30.2% 30.4% 21.3%
% of losses replaced/repaired by July/Oct 2007 67.8% 68.4% 60.6% 72.3% 64.5%
(1) Information on losses and insurance from October 2007 survey. Information on aid and loans from July 2005 survey.
(3) Mean conditional on reporting some aid.
Mean %  of losses paid by insurance (conditional on 
being insured)
% of total losses covered by insurance
Sources of Recovery Funds for Small Businesses and Households
(2) Data from the October 2007 survey. Similar questions asked in the April 2005 survey yielded very similar losses for 
enterprise assets ($814), but losses of just under $900 for household assets.
Table 1





Table 2: Effect of Grants on Profits Among Damaged Firms
Dependent Variable: Real Profits
Own hours
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Trimming No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2024 1993 1587 2095
Number of firms 200 200 172 200
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions also include wave effects.
Real Profits
Notes: Fixed effects estimation, estimated over 11 waves for firms reporting 
profits in 3 or more waves.
Trimmed samples delete the top 1% of percentage and absolute changes in 
profits from one wave to the next.  35
Table 3: Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Amount 19.6*** 14.53 12.88 10.17* 8.79** 19.91***













Observations 1993 1993 1993 1925 1993 1790
Number of firms 200 200 200 193 200 172
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include wave effects and interactions of waves and variable shown.
Notes: Fixed effects estimation, estimated over 11 waves for firms reporting profits 
in 3 or more waves.
Parents / children 
unaffected by tsunami
Trimmed samples delete the top 1% of percentage and absolute 
changes in profits from one wave to the next.  
 







Number of firms 200
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Fixed effects estimation, estimated over 11 waves for 
firms reporting profits in 3 or more waves.  36
Table 5: Which Damaged Firms Recovered Fastest?
Dependent Variable: Log Real Profits
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing dummy -0.286* -0.254* -0.266*
(0.147) (0.150) (0.145)
Female owner -0.663*** -0.636*** -0.619***
(0.164) (0.165) (0.162)
Years of education of owner 0.00305 -3.02e-05 -0.00301
(0.0291) (0.0292) (0.0288)
Age of owner -0.00707 -0.00750 -0.00664
(0.00734) (0.00733) (0.00723)
Owner is married 0.0925 0.102 0.0985
(0.183) (0.183) (0.180)
Business<=3 years old 0.0468 0.0197 0.0294
(0.154) (0.156) (0.152)
Firm had a loan at baseline 0.230 0.200 0.179
(0.158) (0.161) (0.158)
Firm is registered -0.0546 -0.0351 -0.0917
(0.190) (0.191) (0.188)
Log March 2005 profits 0.245** 0.232** 0.245**
(0.101) (0.101) (0.0990)
Log November 2004 profits 0.216* 0.243** 0.217*
(0.113) (0.116) (0.111)
Log distance to the coast 0.212** 0.230** 0.239***
(0.0898) (0.0914) (0.0893)
The firm has a major supplier -0.146
(0.147)
The firm has a major customer -0.326**
(0.152)
Observations 702 702 702
Number of firms 80 80 80
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regression also contains wave effects.
Notes: Random effects estimation on untreated firms suffering business damage, 
estimated over waves 2 to 11.
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Directly Affected Indirectly Affected Unaffected
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Appendix 1: Subsample Comparisons 
 
   40
Appendix 2: Suitability of the Inland firms as a comparison sample. 
 
The strongest predictor of whether or not a firm was damaged by the tsunami is, 
not surprisingly, how close it was located to the coastline. Table A2.1 shows the 
proportion of firms in our sample that experienced asset damage from the tsunami, by 
distance from the coastline. Three-quarters of firms located within 250 meters of the 
shoreline experienced damage, compared to 37 percent of firms located 500 to 750 
meters, and almost no firms claim to have experienced damage if located more than 750 
meters from the shoreline. In some areas, the shape of the coastline mitigated the impact 
of the tsunami, while in others, the tsunami caused a surge in rivers linked to the coast, 
resulting in more damage slightly inland. 
  Did the characteristics of damaged enterprises differ systematically from 
undamaged enterprises located similar distances from the shoreline? This question is 
especially relevant for defining an appropriate comparison group against which to 
measure recovery. If the affected firms are substantially different from unaffected firms, 
the latter group will not be a relevant comparison group. We ran probit regressions on the 
likelihood a microenterprise suffered some damage as a function of owner, firm, and 
location characteristics. The results, shown in Table A2.2, indicate that enterprises with 
more educated owners, those with higher levels of pre-tsunami profits and those which 
had operated for more than three years were somewhat more likely to have suffered 
damage.
17 But we find no association between tsunami damage and the age, marital 
status, and gender of the firm owner, nor with the industry or legal status of the firm. In 
general, the characteristics of affected and unaffected enterprises appear to be similar 
enough to use the latter as a comparison sample for the former. 
Microenterprises in our sample were grouped into three groups: directly affected, 
meaning they had suffered asset damage from the tsunami; indirectly affected, which are 
firms in the same geographic areas as the directly affected, which didn’t suffer damage; 
and unaffected, which were firms located further inland in the same districts. The median 
distance to the coastline is 261 meters for directly affected firms, 495 meters for 
indirectly affected firms, and 7.2 kilometers for unaffected firms.  
                                                 
17 These results thus suggest that it is not the case that richer firms owned by more able owners were able 
to avoid damage by virtue of better construction of premises.   41  42
 